Please Act: Uranium Sales to Russia
October 2008. Please write to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to stop uranium sales to Russia.
We need your help to stop uranium sales to Russia. We've just had a major victory in that battle but more needs to be done.
On September 18, parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties released its report on a uranium export agreement signed by John Howard and Vladimir Putin last September. The Committee concluded that the government should not ratify the agreement until a number of onerous conditions have been met, the most important being:
* The implementation of nuclear safeguards inspections in Russia.
* Russian compliance with its disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
* Further consideration of the unresolved problem of nuclear theft and smuggling.
* Consideration of the ramifications of "recent political events affecting Russia" (e.g. Russia's illegal invasion of Georgia and its illegal threats to strike Poland with nuclear weapons).
* Separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities.
This was a major victory for everyone who raised objections to selling uranium to Putin's Russia. Good on you!
But there is more work to be done. Before the end of the year the government will decide whether to accept, reject or renegotiate the Howard/Putin agreement. Please write to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Foreign Minister Stephen Smith asking them to reject the agreement. Letters are preferable to emails, and personalised comments are preferable to form letters such as the one provided below.
More information on the Howard/Putin agreement is posted at:
<www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/russia>.
The Joint Standing Committee report and submissions are posted at: <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/14may2008>/
Thanks for your support,
Jim Green
National nuclear campaigner
Friends of the Earth, Australia
0417 318 368, <jim.green@foe.org.au>
Contact details:
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT, 2600.
Or contact via web-form: <www.pm.gov.au/contact/index.cfm>
Stephen Smith
Foreign Minister
Parliament House, Canberra, ACT, 2600
Email: <Stephen.Smith.MP@aph.gov.au>
REJECT THE HOWARD/PUTIN URANIUM AGREEMENT
I urge the federal government to reject the Howard/Putin uranium export agreement for the following reasons.
Safeguards are non-existent in Russia
The Howard/Putin agreement clearly fails the safeguards test. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not conducted any safeguards inspections in Russia since 2001. There is no requirement in the Howard/Putin agreement for any IAEA inspections to take place in future. The agreement makes no provision for independent, Australian inspection and verification and we are therefore reliant on IAEA safeguards - which are non-existent. The agreement makes provision for Australian uranium to be processed in unsafeguarded conversion and enrichment plants.
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith's claim that the Howard/Putin agreement meets Australia's safeguards requirements is disingenuous. It is true that Australia does not insist on IAEA inspections being carried out in any uranium customer country but that does not make it acceptable. On the contrary, it points to the need for urgent, serious reform of Australia's safeguards requirements. In the first instance, the government should accept the recommendation of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties that: "It is essential that actual physical inspection by the IAEA occurs at any Russian sites that may handle [Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials]. Further, the supply of uranium to Russia should be contingent upon such inspections being carried out."
The claim by the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office that Australia's "strict" safeguards will "ensure" that Australian uranium remains in peaceful use in Russia has been exposed for the lie that it is. The government should initiate an independent inquiry into the long-standing problem of dishonest and unprofessional behaviour by ASNO.
Russia is a menacing nuclear weapons state
Ratifying a uranium export agreement with a menacing nuclear weapons state would seriously undermine the Rudd government's International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
Russia illegally threatened Poland with nuclear strikes following an August 20 agreement to host US missile defence bases in Poland. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy head of Russia’s general staff, said Poland "is making itself a target. This is 100 per cent certain. Such targets are destroyed as a first priority."
Russia has a huge arsenal of over 14,000 nuclear weapons with an explosive yield equivalent to about 200,000 Hiroshima weapons. The reduction in the number of nuclear weapons held by Russia is no comfort since, in Vladimir Putin's words, Russia plans to make its arsenal "more compact but more effective".
In recent years there have been a steady stream of reports of Russia developing new delivery capabilities, new types of nuclear weapons, increased importance given to nuclear weapons in its security posture, an increase in force exercises, resumption of long-range patrols near NATO airspace, and an increase in missile test launches.
Those actions have been accompanied by threatening comments from Russian politicians and military leaders regarding Russia's nuclear arsenal and their willingness to use and upgrade that arsenal. In recent years Putin has said that maintaining a nuclear arsenal "remains one of the top priorities of Russian Federation policy" and that Russia will develop " missile technology including completely new strategic [nuclear] complexes." General Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the general staff of the armed forces and first deputy minister of defence, said in January 2008 that Russia would use force to protect its territory and allies, "including on a preventative basis, including the use of nuclear weapons".
The situation has only worsened since the Joint Standing Committee reported on the Howard/Putin agreement. On September 26, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that: "By 2020 we must guarantee our capacities of nuclear deterrence in various military and political conditions, in various military and political situations, as well as ensure the comprehensive provision of new types of weapons and means of gathering intelligence. ... We have planned to construct a series of warships. First and foremost nuclear submarine cruisers with cruise missiles and multipurpose submarines. We will also establish an air-space defence system."
Russia's actions and its statements are completely inconsistent with its NPT disarmament obligations.
Lack of respect for national and international law
In Putin's Russia, whistle-blowers and political dissidents are intimidated, imprisoned and sometimes murdered. The media is controlled. Political democracy has been reduced to a sham. As The Australian noted in an editorial following the fraudulent election in Russia last year, "Russia has taken another regrettable step along the road to authoritarianism with a sham poll ... There is no independent judiciary and no rule of law. Corruption is rampant."
Internationally, the situation is no better. Russia has withdrawn from international treaties such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Russia's recent invasion of Georgia was carried out without UN authorisation and without any attempt to secure UN authorisation. Russia's recent threat to strike Poland with nuclear weapons is a violation of international law. The 'modernisation' of Russia's nuclear weapons arsenal is a violation of its international treaty obligations under the NPT.
Nuclear Theft and Smuggling
The IAEA's Director-General, Dr Mohamed El Baradei, has recently estimated that only half of Russia's nuclear materials have been reasonably secured. A 2007 investigation by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and a subsidiary of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency found that a large number of nuclear facilities in Russia have "insufficient" security measures.
From 2001-06, 183 cases of nuclear smuggling were recorded in former Soviet states according to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Of the ex-Soviet states, a study into the links between nuclear smuggling and organised crime from 2001-05 found that the number of incidents in Russia was second only to the Ukraine.
There is evidence that Russia has failed to co-operate with Georgian authorities in relation to nuclear smuggling – a problem likely to worsen in light of recent events. There is also evidence that Russia has reported less than one-third of detected nuclear smuggling incidents to the IAEA for inclusion in its Illicit Trafficking Database.


