By Jim Green

We're often told that the nuclear safeguards system 'ensures' that Australian uranium will not be diverted to produce nuclear weapons. That's a lie. There is a risk of diversion, and claims to the contrary are dishonest. Indeed there is growing recognition of the serious flaws with the safeguards system.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for nuclear safeguards and the head of the IAEA, Dr Mohamed El Baradei, is remarkably frank about the limitations of safeguards. In speeches and papers in recent years, El Baradei has noted that the IAEA's basic rights of inspection are "fairly limited", that the safeguards system suffers from "vulnerabilities" and "clearly needs reinforcement", that efforts to improve the system have been "half-hearted", and that the safeguards system operates on a "shoestring budget ... comparable to that of a local police department ".

Another cause for concern is the ever-growing volume of nuclear exports. Uranium and its by-products through the nuclear chain – low-enriched uranium, depleted uranium and plutonium – are collectively known as Australian-Obligated Nuclear Materials. Of greatest concern is the plutonium, since it can be used directly in nuclear weapons (once extracted from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing).

Irradiation of Australia's uranium exports in power reactors around the world has resulted in the production of over 103 tonnes of plutonium as at the end of 2006 (an increase of 39 tonnes, or 61%, over the past five years). That 103 tonnes of plutonium is enough to build over 10,000 nuclear weapons. If 99% of the plutonium is adequately safeguarded, the remaining 1% would suffice to build 100 plutonium bombs.
 
Labor Party policy

Federal Labor Party policy states that the government will "strengthen export control regimes, and the rights and authority of the IAEA, and tighten controls on the export
 of nuclear material and technology." The policy also states that the Labor government will "only allow export of Australian uranium to countries which observe the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and which are
 committed to non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards."

There are one or two things the Labor government can do to marginally improve safeguards without generating any adverse political reaction – the most obvious being increasing Australia's contribution to the safeguards budget of the IAEA.

But if the government is serious about improving safeguards, it will need to take steps which are likely to generate opposition from uranium mining companies and from some of the countries which purchase Australian uranium. For example, none of the nuclear weapons states are serious about their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament and therefore they ought not be eligible to purchase Australia's uranium. Yet uranium export agreements are in place with the US, France, the UK and China.

Russia

In 2007, the Coalition government signed a uranium export agreement with Russia and the Labor government will have to decide whether to approve the agreement. The Labor Party has already expressed support for the proposed exports to Russia based on its policy of supporting sales to any NPT signatory state, even undemocratic, murderous and militaristic regimes such as those that rule China and Russia.

Russia is not at all serious about its NPT disarmament obligations. Indeed Russian President Vladimir Putin said on national television in October 2007 that Russia is developing new types of nuclear weapons and expanding its delivery capabilities via missiles, submarines and strategic bombers. He described the nuclear expansion plans as "grandiose" and "fully realistic".

Another concern is inadequate security of nuclear materials in Russia. On December 1, 2007, New Scientist reported that there are "gaping holes" in the arrangements meant to prevent the theft of nuclear materials in Russia. From 2001 to 2006, there were 183 reported trafficking incidents involving nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. 



Then there is the lack of democracy in Russia and the disrespect for the rights of protesters and whistle-blowers – all factors that could adversely effect the safeguarding of Australian uranium. One notorious recent incident was the murder of dissident Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned in London with the radioactive material polonium-210. The Russian government has refused to extradite a former KGB operative suspected of involvement in the murder.

Allowing uranium sales to Russia would not only be unconscionable, it would also be a breach of the Labor Party's policy to allow uranium exports only to countries which are "committed to non-proliferation".

Plutonium and spent fuel reprocessing

In addition to IAEA safeguards, countries purchasing Australian uranium must sign a bilateral agreement. The most important provisions are for prior Australian consent before Australian nuclear material is transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20% uranium-235, or reprocessed.

However no Australian government has ever refused permission to separate plutonium from spent fuel via reprocessing. Even when reprocessing leads to the stockpiling of plutonium, ongoing or 'programmatic' permission has been granted by Australian governments. Hence there are stockpiles of 'Australian-obligated' plutonium in Japan and in some European countries.

At one level there is a simple solution – the Labor government should simply ban the reprocessing of spent fuel generated from Australian uranium. After all, precious little of the uranium is recycled from reprocessing plants, the plutonium is a curse, and reprocessing is so polluting that even a director of the World Nuclear Association describes it as 'environmentally dirty'. The problems with reprocessing are such that the Coalition government made it illegal to build reprocessing plants in Australia, and the Labor Party assented to this legislation.

At another level, banning reprocessing of Australian-origin nuclear materials will be difficult – the uranium mining companies will bleat, and some customer countries will insist on their 'right' to do as they please with Australian nuclear materials.

Mike Rann – then a young Labor Party researcher and now the pro-uranium Premier of South Australia – noted in his 1982 booklet on uranium mining that: "Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first." Let's see if Prime Minister Rudd takes a principled stand on this issue of nuclear reprocessing or if he continues the long Australian tradition of putting profits ahead of WMD proliferation risks.

Material Unaccounted For

Perhaps the most intractable problem with safeguards is that nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the difficulty of precisely measuring nuclear materials. The accounting discrepancies are known as Material Unaccounted For. This problem of imprecise measurement provides an obvious loophole for anyone wanting to divert nuclear materials for weapons production. In a large plant, even a tiny percentage of the annual through-put of nuclear material will suffice to build one or more weapons with virtually no chance of detection by IAEA inspectors.

The Coalition government refused to publicly reveal any country-specific information, or even aggregate information, concerning accounting discrepancies involving Australian uranium or its by-products such as plutonium. It is to be hoped that the incoming Labor government will be more transparent.

Of course, releasing information about unaccounted Australian-origin nuclear materials will likely pose a problem for the government. More Australians would oppose the uranium export industry if they knew the extent and frequency of nuclear accounting discrepancies.

Australians would be further disenchanted with the uranium industry if its negligible contribution to export revenue was better understood. Uranium accounts for less than one-third of one percent of Australia's export revenue – significantly less than the export revenue from cheese or wines. And the industry's contribution to employment is even more underwhelming – uranium mining accounts for one-hundredth of one percent of Australian jobs.

As the Labor Party explores and details its fairly vague promises to improve safeguards, perhaps it could reopen discussion on the broader question: do the meagre economic benefits from uranium mining outweigh the weapons proliferation risks associated with the industry?

More information:
* Nuclear Safeguards and Australia's Uranium Exports <www.foe.org.au/campaigns/anti-nuclear/issues/mining/UraniumSafeguards.doc/view>
* Medical Association for the Prevention of War, "An Illusion of Protection: The Unavoidable Limitations of Safeguards", <www.mapw.org.au/Illusion%20of%20Protection%20index.html>
* Professor Richard Broinowski, "Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia's Nuclear Ambitions", Melbourne: Scribe, 2003.
* EnergyScience Coalition Briefing Paper #19, "Who's Watching the Nuclear Watchdog? A Critique of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office", <www.energyscience.org.au>.